California , however, a narrower view was asserted, the primacy of warrants was again emphasized, and a standard by which the scope of searches pursuant to arrest could be ascertained was set out. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of someone who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. Although the viability of Chimel had been in doubt for some time as the Court refined and applied its analysis of reasonable and justifiable expectations of privacy, it has in some but not all contexts survived the changed rationale.
Thus, in Mincey v. The occupant had been arrested and removed and it was true, the Court observed, that a person legally taken into custody has a lessened right of privacy in his person, but he does not have a lessened right of privacy in his entire house. And, in United States v. Chimel has, however, been qualified by another consideration. Belton held that police officers who had made a valid arrest of the occupant of a vehicle could make a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger compartment of the automobile, including containers found therein.
United States, U. Moore, S. Ohio, U. California, U. The Court, in Birchfield v. North Dakota , U. Robinson, U. See also id. The Court applied the same rule in Gustafson v. Florida, U. Unlike the situation in Robinson , police regulations did not require the Gustafson officer to take the suspect into custody, nor did a departmental policy guide the officer as to when to conduct a full search.
The Court found these differences inconsequential, and left for another day the problem of pretextual arrests in order to obtain basis to search. Soon thereafter, the Court upheld conduct of a similar search at the place of detention, even after a time lapse between the arrest and search. United States v. Edwards, U. See Birchfield , slip op. McNeely, U. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that warrantless blood tests are needed as an alternative to warrantless breath tests to detect impairing substances other than alcohol or to obtain the BAC of an unconscious or uncooperative driver.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that could be used in order to resist arrest or effect escape. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must be governed by a like rule. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control.
When Chief Justice Warren extended the use of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio , the Warren Court was accused of coddling criminals.
Warren resigned from the Court on 23 June , the same day the Chimel case was decided. President Richard Nixon chose as his replacement a strong critic of the exclusionary rule, Warren E. In , in Williams v. United States, the Court decided that the "Chimel rule," limiting a search area to within a person's immediate control incidental to an arrest, could not be applied retroactively and should not affect searches conducted prior to the date of the Chimel decision.
Through the s, the Supreme Court permitted law enforcement officers to search anything in the suspect's immediate control, meaning anywhere from which the arrestee might obtain a weapon.
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